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Comments On "The Active Administrative Law Judge:
Is There Harm in an ALJ Asking?"
Nigel G. Wright*
This comment adds to the remarks made by Professor Allen E.
Shoenbergerl in his article, The Active Administrative Law Judge:
Is There Any Harm in an ALJ Asking?,2 which defends the practice
of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) asking parties questions during a hearing. I must thank Professor Shoenberger for his review
of appellate cases on the problem. The cases support his position
and will help to establish this position in arguments with those who
disagree.' I think, however, that there are problems in the area,
not discussed in the decisions, and disclosed only by reading the
hearing transcripts or by discussion with ALJs. Such a discussion is
appropriate here, particularly in consideration of the audience of
this Journal that comprises ALJs (from the widest variety of administrative set-ups), practitioners, scholars and judges (hopefully).
I think I can be relatively candid about this, partly because I am
now retired.4 I wish also, in Part II, to pursue the suggestion in
footnote one of Professor Shoenberger's article that we compare
the civil law system's so called "inquisitorial" system of hearings.5
I.

INTRODUCTION

The particular kinds of hearings I am talking about are tax
cases.6 In a tax case, the controversy is initiated by an audit, and
the formal hearing proceeding is commenced by the taxpayer with
a petition. The taxpayer has the burden of proof (he, after all,
* Retired Administrative Law Judge for the New York State Division of Tax
Appeals. A.B., Cornell University, 1952; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1955.
1. Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago.
2. Allen E. Schoenberger, The Active Administrative Law Judge: Is There Harm
in an ALJ Asking?, 18 J. NAALJ 399 (1998).

3. I even learned of a case in my own jurisdiction I had not encountered.
4. I was an ALJ in the New York State Division of Tax Appeals, part of the NYS
Department of Taxation, for a number of years and prior to that, a Hearing Officer, a
predecessor position, in the NYS Department of Taxation.
5. See Schoenberger, supra note 2, at 399.
6. The cases I adjudicated were tax cases. See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 2000-2024. See
also http://www.nysdta.org (Click "what's new" for our latest determinations).
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knows the facts). The taxpayer (or the taxpayer's principle officer)
sometimes appears alone, sometimes with an attorney (who only
occasionally is a tax specialist), but most often the taxpayer appears with only a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). 7 The Department appears by an attorney from its Counsel's office. A CPA
appearing alone for the party almost always expects the AU to
conduct the examination. After the hearing, the ALJ has six
months to render his determination. Appeals may be taken to the
Tax Appeals Tribunal, which is also in our Division.
We would do well to remember the reasons judges do not ask
questions during their trials. The attorney presenting a witness
should use a sequence of questions that bring out the salient facts
in an understandable way while avoiding questions that may produce objectionable testimony. The attorney is supposed to "control" his witness. Often in an ALJ hearing, however, the attorney
leaves important gaps in his presentation, either deliberately to
avoid troublesome issues or out of ignorance.8 At the same time,
there is no jury present so there is little risk of objectionable testimony. In this situation, the ALJ should ask clarifying questions, to
avoid any delay in gathering the information efficiently. It is probably best to do so by first suggesting that the attorney question the
witness about the matters omitted. Another suggestion that might
reduce the occasion for the AU to take the initiative in questioning is to strongly encourage the parties to note for the record that
their objections aid a judge in analyzing the evidence. Of course,
for better or worse, simply exploratory or nafve questions can flush
out facts, creating the basis for additional examination.
Asking questions during a cross-examination is another matter.
At least theoretically, a cross-examiner can lay traps for the witness, and back him or her into a corner. A stray question from the
ALJ could tip off the witness and undercut any such strategies. (Of
course, I seldom saw such a sophisticated cross-examination.) The
AU will usually hold back and let the attorney continue in the
manner the attorney wants. After the cross-examination, the AL
can pitch in. But, a problem occurs here too. At times I have hit
pay dirt but only to have the cross-examiner (the Department attorney) object, sometimes bitterly, because he missed the point
7. Taxpayers have even appeared before me with only a CPA in half-million dol-

lar cases!
8. It is difficult to find published sources on what constitutes a prima facie case in
an administrative hearing.
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himself and anticipated criticism. This same general problem occurred when I helped out the taxpayer (I am something of a technical specialist). Taxpayer's attorneys can take umbrage at this.
So let me get to the main point I want to make. There is at least
one good reason for the ALJ not to ask questions: The AL's
question or even his disposition may be so suggestive that, in effect,
he suborns perjury! Typically, in my cases anyway, the taxpayer
knows all the facts and the Department knows none of the facts.
Some of the taxpayer's are swift enough to tailor their testimony in
their favor. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Department does nothing to protect itself nor does it use its subpoena
power. Usually, only the taxpayer's CPA, and not the taxpayer,
appears at the prior conference. It is routine practice to have an
auditor interview the taxpayer and even outsiders without obtaining written statements. (Imagine an auto insurance adjuster doing that!) Any credibility problem with the witness is compounded
by a credibility problem with the auditor.
Of course, credibility is the bane of the ALJs job. We try to
avoid it by making our substantive rules depend on more objective
factors either directly or through presumptions. (These are not
only not printed anywhere but are often "made up as we go along,"
which is an entirely different problem.)
A "withering cross-examination" is the counter to a credibility
problem. However, I have seen this only once. In this instance,
the young attorney for the Department, in his first case, had great
sixth sense and did everything right, except he suggested near the
end that "the taxpayer's credibility is in issue." The young attorney
won his case. I later learned that my superior, not an attorney,
banned him from future hearings. My superior suggested that the
young attorney was not a "gentleman" and did not treat taxpayer's
with the proper respect. Thus the credibility issue still remains, and
of course, the ALJ himself is supposed to be a "gentleman."
There is another reason for a failure to conduct a strong crossexamination. In this situation, the attorney for the Department
conducts only a very cursory cross-examination because he believes the witness is telling the truth, and fears that a strong crossexamination will re-enforce the testimony. (An Assistant District
Attorney I once knew thought that this presented ethical problems
for a prosecuting attorney and felt it his duty to cross-examine the
witness because that is what the system expects, but I suppose that
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is another question.) Obviously the ALJ has to decide what to do
in this situation. I usually examine, but a less motivated ALJ may
not examine.
There are two other points that can affect the decision of an AL
to be active or passive. Many people classify these as, to use a
current term, dysfunctional. If I were to discuss specific situations
in a hearing I would just dance around these points.
First, during the hearings, the AU is often ignorant of the specific law involved in the case. For example, tax law and regulations
include parts that are very complex and are not commonly encountered. The ALJ does not see the file ahead of time because the
Department asserts it could prejudice the ALJ. The pleadings are
at best pro forma and state as little as possible. The Department's
attorney is frequently unprepared and cites no authority or precedent for the Department's argument. (The attorney feels that the
AL is paid more so he should do his own work.) Indeed, one
fairly new and fairly good AL told me that he seldom knew the
issues even after the hearing ended. The admonition of our supervisors is to go along with this and not make the Department's attorney look bad. I think, however, the AU must ask as many
questions as possible, regardless of the feelings of the Department's attorney.
The other dysfunctional factor is the supervisory pressure. An
ALs decision is reviewed, edited and even revised by the supervisors prior to being sent out. (At times the decisions are completely
reversed without the ALJs knowledge.) Both supervisors have
only a very limited knowledge of legal proceedings (in fact, the
chief AU never participated in or presided over a judicial or administrative hearing). Both believe that credibility is a conclusion
of law and take more license to comment on conclusions of law.
They are usually very pro Department. Prior cases, in favor of the
taxpayer are routinely overlooked or ignored. Furthermore, for
the AU to have to argue with the supervisors can be anywhere
from tedious to futile. To prevent this, the ALJs chat up the case
with them before preparing the decision. An ALJ, with all this in
mind, tends to adopt a completely adversarial posture and ask as
few questions as possible.
Incidentally, while the ALJ is in the hearing room, I recommend
staying on the record at all times even for the simplest things. For
example, if someone wants to go off the record, the ALJ should
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leave the room and have the reporter note that fact. This can prevent later arguments.
Professor Shoenberger offers a list of suggestions at the end of
his article that should be considered. 9
II.

INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM V. COMMON LAW SYSTEM

Professor Shoenberger, in footnote two, invites the reader to
compare the passive style of the common-law judge with the "inquisitorial style" of the civil law jurisdictions.' 0 I am delighted that
Professor Shoenberger refers to the inquisitorial system with apparent approval. I frequently experienced supervisors who used
the term with derision to oppose any change from purported adversarial rules. This part suggests some leads to find out more
about the inquisitorial system.
Perhaps the fastest and most direct way to learn about the civil
law system is an article by Professor John Langbein of Chicago
Law School." The article argues that while the parties can be adversarial in their arguments and suggestions to the judge, it is the
judge who develops the facts of the case from the very beginning of
the case.' 2 There is no separate pre-trial phase where the parties3
spend time trying to anticipate issues that might never emerge.1
This allows the judge to focus on the most decisive issues. Furthera4
more, the attorneys cannot meet with or prompt witnesses. (I
can't see American lawyers abiding by such a rule.)
I would especially recommend to people interested in civil law
proceedings to read the works of Mirjan Damaska, specifically, The
Faces of Justice and State Authority.' 5 Damaska compares the common-law and civil law systems according to whether the structure
of the system is hierarchical or coordinate (single-level), and
whether the purpose of the system is conflict-resolution or policy
9. See Schoenberger, supra note 2, at 410-11.
10. See id. at 399.
11. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823 (1985).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 826. A more comprehensive treatment of civil law procedures appears in Ordinary Proceedingsin FirstInstance, XVI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 6; see also History of European Civil Procedure,XVI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch.2.
15. MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY

(1986).
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implementation.16 This conceptual structure provokes observations that are not often made. For instance, it is the coordinate
system of the common law, where many jurors and others must get
together at the same time, that necessitates that a trial occur all at
one time. Under a hierarchical system, the proceedings can take
place in installments. That, of course, is ideal for a judge whose
primary duty is to develop the facts of a case. The best defense
against perjury is not cross-examination, though that is allowed,
but rather a simple adjournment and re-investigation. Furthermore, in a conflict resolution system, a party can trade away or
ignorantly waive the party's rights, while in a policy implementation system, accuracy is everything and the judge must inquire. 17
Another reason for reading Damaska is that his language is fresh,
often based on historical or literal meanings, which can be, in itself,
arresting and illuminating. It is an interesting read. 18
One result of reading the Damaska book for me was that I
started thinking about trying to develop a conceptual scheme with
which to compare our various forms of administrative hearings.
The factors I would want to take into account include the adequacy
of the pleadings and the degree of expertise in substantive law expected of the ALJ (especially compared to the Department's
knowledge). Other ALJs, I am sure, would have their own ideas. I
would like to encourage this examination. It might lead to more
pragmatic, efficient, and fair ways of conducting ALJ proceedings.
16. See id.
17. If these points are too obvious, I think I can assure you that other points

would not be; in fact, you may even disagree with some things Damaska says.
18. Damaska has also written on evidentiary problems. See Mirjan Damaska, Of
Hearsay and its Analogues, 76 MINN. L. REV. 425 (1992); see also Mirjan Damaska,
Free Proof and its Detractors, 43 AM. J. CoMp. L. 343 (1995).

